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Summary
Background: Between roughly 500 BCE and 300 BCE, three
distinct regions, the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys, the
Eastern Mediterranean, and the Ganges Valley, saw the emer-
gence of highly similar religious traditions with an unprece-
dented emphasis on self-discipline and asceticism and with
‘‘otherworldly,’’ often moralizing, doctrines, including Bud-
dhism, Jainism, Brahmanism, Daoism, Second Temple Juda-
ism, and Stoicism, with later offshoots, such as Christianity,
Manichaeism, and Islam. This cultural convergence, often
called the ‘‘Axial Age,’’ presents a puzzle: why did this emerge
at the same time as distinct moralizing religions, with highly
similar features in different civilizations? The puzzle may be
solved by quantitative historical evidence that demonstrates
an exceptional uptake in energy capture (a proxy for general
prosperity) just before the Axial Age in these three regions.
Results: Statistical modeling confirms that economic devel-
opment, not political complexity or population size, accounts
for the timing of the Axial Age.
Conclusions: We discussed several possible causal path-
ways, including the development of literacy and urban life,
and put forward the idea, inspired by life history theory, that
absolute affluence would have impacted human motivation
and reward systems, nudging people away from short-term
strategies (resource acquisition and coercive interactions)
and promoting long-term strategies (self-control techniques
and cooperative interactions).
Introduction
The term ‘‘Axial Age’’ was coined in 1947 by the German
philosopher Karl Jaspers to describe the concomitant emer-
gence of a range of doctrines that eventually lead to the emer-
gence of world religions. Jaspers argued that this period was
pivotal in the sense that the questions that people ask today
about the way they should live their lives and the answers
they get from today’s religions and philosophies were all in-
vented at that time. ‘‘Man, as we know him today, came into
being’’ wrote Jaspers [1].
Indeed, to most people, believers and nonbelievers alike, it
seems obvious that religion is on the side of the spiritual*Correspondence: nbaumard@gmail.comrather than the material world and that it fosters self-discipline
and selflessness rather than license and greed. However,
such spiritual and moral concerns are recent in human history
[1, 2]. In hunter-gatherer societies, early chiefdoms, and
archaic states, religions focused on performing rituals, offer-
ing sacrifices, and respecting taboos in order to ward off
misfortune and ensure prosperity [3, 4]. By contrast, between
roughly 500 BCE and 300 BCE, new doctrines appeared in
three places in Eurasia (the Yellow and Yangzi rivers, the
Ganga Valley, and the eastern part of the Mediterranean;
see Figure 1). These doctrines all emphasized the value of
‘‘personal transcendence’’ [5], that is, the notion that human
existence has a purpose, distinct from material success,
that lies in a moral existence and in the control of one’s own
material desires, through moderation (in food, sex, ambition,
etc.), asceticism (fasting, abstinence, detachment), and
compassion (helping, suffering with others). This higher pur-
pose is reflected in the constitution of the universe itself
(e.g., through karma or logos). Beyond this material world
lies another reality in which human existence acquires a
new meaning. In this other reality, humans are not just bodies
anymore. They are endowed with a soul and can survive the
death of their bodily incarnation. Most importantly, in this
other reality, individuals pursuing material success are
doomed. Only moderation and moral behavior guarantee sal-
vation [2].
The emergence of spiritual and moralizing religions is well
documented, occurring over a short period, between the fifth
century BCE and the third century BCE (some of them became
culturally dominant a few centuries later). In the Ganges Valley,
Buddhism, Samkhya, Ajivikism, and Jainism appeared in the
Magadha and Kosama kingdoms in the late fifth century BCE
[6, 7], although ascetic movements were probably present
already. These movements spread rapidly to the rest of India
under the Mauryan Empire (ca. 320–185 BCE). Vedism, in
turn influenced by these spiritual movements, underwent a
massive transformation, integrating asceticism and karma in
the new Brahmanic orthodoxy [6, 8, 9].
In the Mediterranean, self-discipline and ascetic doctrines,
combined with a moral outlook, appeared in Greek city-states
in the late fifth century BCE [10, 11], with precursors in
Orphism and Pythagoreanism [12]. This spiritual trend grew
stronger and spread outside continental Greece in the fourth
century, developing into the Hellenistic movements known
as Stoicism, Epicureanism, Skepticism, and Cynicism. Beliefs
that the gods and the universe were on the side of the moral
good [9, 13] and that good behaviors would be rewarded in
the afterlife (see, for instance, Plato’s Republic and Pindar’s
Odes) [9, 14] emerged during the same period. Although these
ideas were still marginal in the fifth century BCE, literary works
such as Virgil’s Aeneid and Plutarch’s On Superstitions sug-
gest that they had become mainstream among elite Romans
by 100 CE [15, 16].
In China, although the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are now
recognized as late compilations, recent studies have traced
the beginning of self-discipline doctrines go back to the fourth
century BCE [17–20], the same time Confucius started his
moral teaching. Similarly, the belief in divine punishment
Figure 1. Map of Axial Religions and Movements
SomeAxial Age religions and spiritualmovements:
1, Pythagoreanism; 2, Orphism; 3, Platonism; 4,
Stoicism; 5, Epicureanism; 6, Second-Temple
Judaism; 7, Ajivika; 8, Samkhya; 9, Buddhism;
10, Jainism; 11, Hinduism; 12, Taoism; 13, Confu-
cianism.
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11(through the celestial bureaucracy), previously thought to have
come from Buddhism between the first and third centuries CE,
may have appeared before the Han empire [21]. The rising
popularity of Lao Zi in the late Han empire and the appearance
of Daoist mass movements such as the Celestial Masters
confirm the gradual influence of ascetic and spiritual ideolo-
gies early in the Common Era.
These processes raise the following question: why did
these similar movements emerge simultaneously? These
innovative religious movements could not have resulted
from the emergence of large-scale state polities (Sumerian,
Egyptian, Mayan, Inca, and Zhou empires), many of which
had priestly organized religions but lacked this focus on as-
ceticism and morality. The puzzle may be solved by recent
advances in evolutionary psychology that suggest that ab-
solute affluence has predictable effects on human motiva-
tion and reward systems [22–24], moving individuals away
from ‘‘fast life’’ strategies (resource acquisition and coercive
interactions) and toward ‘‘slow life’’ strategies (self-control
techniques and cooperative interactions) typically found in
axial movements. In line with this idea, quantitative studies
reveal a sharp increase in energy capture (a reliable proxy
for affluence [5]; see Figure 2) occurring at the same time
in three distinct regions of Eurasia (the Yellow and Yangzi
rivers, the Ganga Valley, and the eastern part of the Mediter-
ranean). At the end of the first millennium BCE, these re-
gions reached an economic level (>20,000 kcal/capita/day)
that greatly surpassed the economic level of previous so-
cieties, from 4,000 kcal for hunter-gatherer societies to
15,000 kcal for archaic large-scale civilizations like Egypt
or Sumer [5].
In this paper, we sought to formally test for a potential link
between the emergence of axial religions and the affluence
of the societies in which they emerged. We computed the
extent to which different social variables were associated
with the emergence of axial religions. Specifically, we devel-
oped and compared stochastic models (formally, an inho-
mogeneous Poisson process) in which the probability of the
emergence rate during a given time period depends on the
value of one factor. This can be viewed as one special form
of logistic regression (classically used to assess the classifica-
tion power of one of several explaining factors) that simply
takes into account the duration between successive data
points. All models were divided into the following two subsets:
(1) models based on variables indexing the level of affluence,
which were referred to as affluence proxy models, and (2)models based on factors reflecting polit-
ical success, which were referred to as
political complexity proxy models. We
used classical Bayesian methods to
select the model under which the
observed data are most likely to occur.
The Akaike information criterion (AIC)
measures those likelihoods and allowscomparison between political complexity proxy models, afflu-
ence proxy models, and a null model (homogeneous Poisson,
i.e., zero-factor model).
Results
First, all four political complexity proxy models failed to ac-
count for the emergence of axial religions better than the
null model, except for the state population model, which
outperformed it by a small margin (Figure 3A). In contrast,
five out of the six affluence proxy models accounted for
the occurrence of Axial Age religions significantly better
than the null model and the state population model. Overall,
the main city population model and the energy capture
model were the most likely according to the data, with a dif-
ferential AIC value of 8. In other words, whereas political
complexity models fail to explain the data (i.e., they did
not perform better than the null model), the affluence param-
eters are 4,900 and 3,200 times more likely to be true than
the null model.
In the maximum-likelihood energy capture model, there was
a sharp transition around 20,000 kcal/capita/day, before which
there was virtually a null probability of appearance of axial reli-
gion and after which there was a high probability of appear-
ance within a few centuries (Figure 3B), confirming predictions
from our first qualitative approach. On the contrary, maximum-
likelihood models for any political complexity proxy displayed
much weaker modulation of probability of appearance by the
associated factor.
Second, because one of the political success proxies (state
population) provided a (slightly) better-than-chance account
of the data, we wanted to know whether that predictive power
of state population, with respect to appearance of axial reli-
gions, was complimentary to or absorbed in the predictive
power of affluence proxies. To that end, we coupled state pop-
ulation and energy capture (the best predicting proxy for afflu-
ence) to build a two-factor model in which appearance rate
was dependent on the joint values of those two variables.
There was still less evidence for the two-factor model than
for the single energy capture model (Figure 4), suggesting
that knowing state population did not add any predictive po-
wer to knowing energy capture. We found the same trend
when using the second-best predicting proxy for affluence
(main city population). This confirms that whereas affluence
proxies provide very good indicators for the emergence of
axial religions, political success proxies do not.
Figure 2. Evolution of Energy Capture since the Neolithic Revolution
(A) Evolution of energy capture in the fivemost-intensive agricultural zones from 11,000BCE to 0CE. The dotted line represents the level of energy capture in
hunter-gatherers societies. The dotted square represents the evolution of energy capture during the period represented in (B).
(B) Evolution of Greek house size, a proxy for energy capture, adapted from [24].
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The results support our initial hypothesis that economic de-
velopment rather than political complexity explains the emer-
gence of axial religions. This is congruent with the qualitative
description of some religious historians, who, following Jas-
pers, noted that Axial Age movements did not appear in the
largest archaic states (i.e., Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, Persia)
but rather in smaller prosperous polities, such as the Greek
city-states, the richest Mahajanapada, and the most devel-
oped of the Chinese warring states.
Before discussing the possible interpretations of this anal-
ysis, it is important to note that more data would be needed
to adequately test the robustness of this conclusion. The prox-
ies we used for affluence and political complexity remain very
crude, and we hope that better data will become available in
the near future. It is all the more important that the data used
in this analysis probably lead to an underestimation of the
role ofmaterial prosperity. First, we used a very crudemeasure
of urbanization (size of the main city) that greatly underesti-
mates the astonishing rates of urbanization of Greece, China,
and India during the Axial Age [25, 26]. Second, absolute en-
ergy capture does not take into account the distribution of re-
sources within a given society (e.g., the Gini index). Because
the small Greek poleis, for instance, were considerably more
egalitarian than the great empires of Egypt or Persia, it can
be assumed that the energy capture available to the upper
middle class in Greece (within the axial movements emerged)
was probably much greater than what was available to the cor-
responding class in Persia or Egypt. Finally, the lack of reliable
and extensive archaeological data precluded the inclusion of
many non-Eurasian empires (Hawaii, Yoruba, Kongo, etc.) as
well as many preaxial ancient empires (Phoenicia, Nubia,
etc.) that would have provided additional independent cases
for comparing economic and political factors. Given what we
know about the absence of spiritual and moral religions in all
of these societies [1–4], their inclusion in the sample would
greatly strengthen our model.
Although our analysis suggests that the Axial Age may be
the product of an increase in standard of living in the most
affluent societies of antiquity, it leaves open the question ofthe proximate mechanisms by which affluence leads to the
emergence of new kinds of religions. One possibility, originally
proposed by Jaspers [1], is that axial religions resulted from
the emergence of a new class of scholars or priests who had
the resource and the time to elaborate more abstract religions.
Additionally, economic prosperity could have changed reli-
gions through the development of literacy and schooling, giv-
ing rise to more educated believers.
Although this hypothesis explains the clear increase in
cognitive sophistication in religious doctrines during the Axial
Age, it does not account for their specific content (rising
importance of morality and spirituality) and the practice they
are associated with (generosity, asceticism). In particular, it
does not account for why the new upper class would have
been particularly attracted by the condemnation of earthly
pleasures, food, luxury, or social status.
Another possibility is that affluence may have promoted a
new way of life through the emergence of more cosmopolitan,
open, and diverse societies in which generosity, universality,
and self-control became more attractive. This alternative
fits very well with the importance of main city population in
our model, a proxy for the development of urban life, and
with the social recruitment of the axial movement among the
better off.
Finally, the effect of affluence on religion could be under-
stood in terms of life history theory [2], specifically focusing
on the contrast between a ‘‘fast’’ strategy, with short-term
investment of resources (e.g., early reproduction, more off-
spring, and less nurturing), and a ‘‘slow’’ strategy, with oppo-
site characteristics [23, 27]. Shifts of strategies are known to
be triggered by environmental cues, such as the harshness
or unpredictability of environments; they result in lower or
higher degree of cooperation [22, 24, 28] and in investment
in the self [29], a phenomenon originally described by Maslow
in his ‘‘pyramid of needs’’ model [30, 31].
In this life history perspective, a massive increase in pros-
perity and certainty during the Axial Age may have triggered
a drastic change in strategies, shifting motivations away
from materialistic goals (acquiring more wealth, higher social
status) [23] and short-term aggressive strategies (‘‘an eye for
an eye’’) [24], typical of fast life strategies, toward long-term
Figure 3. Comparison of Differential AICc for Sin-
gle-Factor Models
(A) Comparison of all single-factor models for the
emergence of axial movements. The left panel
uses raw variables as factor; the right panel
uses their growth over time. Orange bars repre-
sent political success proxies; green bars depict
affluence proxies. Differential AIC (equal to the
difference between the null model AIC and the
single-factor model) indexes the support for
each model from the data: higher values indicate
larger support.
(B) Appearance rate as a function of state popula-
tion (left), state surface (center), and energy cap-
ture (right) in each of the corresponding
maximum-likelihood models (see Supplemental
Information for more information). Energy capture
model shows a very sharp transition around
20,000 kcal/capita/day from lower values, where
appearance is very likely, to higher values, where
appearance is very unlikely, showing that energy
capture provides a strong predictor for the
appearance of axial religion. By contrast, for
both state population and state surface, over
most of the range of values, the appearance rate
remains in an intermediate region where appear-
ance is moderately likely, indicating that these
two variables provide poor predictors for the
appearance of axial religions.
Figure 4. Comparison of Differential AICc for Double-Factor Models
Comparison of differential AICc for single-factor models (state population
and energy capture state population) with differential AICc for two-factors
models, showing (1) that coupling any of the two best-predicting proxies
for affluence with state population did not improve evidence for the model
and (2) that coupling the two best-predicting proxies for affluence did not
improve the affluence model.
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13investment in reciprocation (‘‘do unto others.’’) and in
self-development (variously described as the ‘‘good life’’ or
‘‘self-actualization’’ in Maslow’s original theory). This shift in
priorities progressively would have impacted religious and in-
tellectual traditions through a transmission bias, in favor of
doctrines and institutions that coincided with the new values
[2, 4, 32]. In a nutshell, at some point in the middle of the first
millennium BCE, old ‘‘ritual’’ religions emphasizing short-
term strategies would have been supplanted by new ‘‘spiri-
tual’’ religions that emphasized long-term strategies through
asceticism and self-control techniques.
In this perspective, it would be relevant to investigate
whether axial societies also exhibited other characteristics
specific to slow strategies, such as a high parental investment
or long-term monogamy [33]. Another possible area of investi-
gation could be to study parallel phenomena later in history
where more detailed historical series are available. A case in
point is the concomitant emergence in medieval Europe of as-
cetic and moralizing movements both inside the church (e.g.,
the Franciscans, the Dominicans, the Beguines, etc.) and
outside the church (e.g., the Humiliati, the Waldesians, or the
Cathars) [34].
Experimental Procedures
We used energy capture as a proxy for affluence but also relied on more
classical, albeit indirect, proxies for affluence, such as population density,
population growth, and the population of the main city: population density
is a proxy for economic development that allowsmore inhabitants in a given
area, population growth requires increased survival rates and thus is corre-
lated with economic prosperity, and main city population is a proxy for ur-
banization, another good indicator of economic prosperity.
We used state population and state surface as a proxy for political
complexity of the main state of the area of interest. These variables, com-
monly mentioned in the historical literature, assess large-scale cultural
changes. It has been generally assumed in classical scholarship of religion
that there was a connection between social structure and the contents ofreligious doctrines. More recently, some authors have argued that moral re-
ligions emerged because they were indispensable to ensuring large-scale
cooperation in large-scale societies [5].
As all historical models predict that world religions only appear in com-
plex societies, we only considered the eight most advanced areas of antiq-
uity (Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, Anatolia, India, China, Mesoamerica,
and the Andes). Using Morris’s work [5], we created time series for energy
capture in Greece, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and China. We recon-
structed changes in energy capture in India, Mesoamerica, and the Andes
using the same parameters (see Supplemental Information available online).
We used evidence from political geography for state size and state
Figure 5. Evolution of Environmental Variables
(A–F) Evolution of each environmental variable, per century and per area of interest, and the emergence of axial movements (stars) at 400 BC.
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14population [35, 36] and evidence from historical demography for population
growth, main city population and density [37, 38].
We used the standard list of axial movements described in the literature.
One problem with cross-cultural studies is that cultural phenomena are
often not independent from each other (because, for instance, they have
all been in contact with Christian missionaries), and their comparisons
may produce spurious correlations [39]. To avoid this case of ‘‘Galton’s
problem,’’ we considered only one data point per cultural area (e.g., all
Greek sects counted as only one axial case) and excluded one cultural
area—Israel—for which cultural independence could not be proven (due
notably to the influence of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Hellenistic Greece
throughout its history). Finally, we could not include Zoroastrianism due
the lack of reliable historical dating of the movement (estimates typically
range from 1500 BCE to 600 BCE).
Although our data set comprised only eight independent cultural regions
(three of which hosted the emergence of axial religions), the very long tem-
poral depth of the time series (e.g., more than 3,000 years in the case of
Egypt and Mesopotamia) allowed us to robustly survey the ecological fac-
tors favoring the emergence of axial religions. Thus, whereas cross-cultural
studies of religions usually compare multiple societies taken at a single
point in time, we used data from a few regions over a long time interval.
Historical data were thus available for eight distinct areas of interest
(Egypt, Greece, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, China, India, Mesoamerica, and
the Andes) from 3000 BCE to 0 CE, in intervals of one to five centuries,
and consisted of time series for six different factors: energy capture, popu-
lation, density, state population, state surface, andmain city population (see
Figure 5). Although the absolute level of affluence seems crucial, its dy-
namics could also play a role (i.e., stagnation or decline may interact with
absolute level of affluence). We thus extended our analysis by adding sin-
gle-factor models based on the growth rate of each parameter rather than
on its absolute value. We computed the rate of growth for these factors
(excluding the first data point in each region) simply defined for time series
xi as (xi 2 xi21)/(ti 2 ti21), where ti is the date corresponding to the data
points. Note that once axial religions appear they may coexist with nonaxial
practices (as was the case in the remote provinces of the Roman Empire
after the conversion of Constantine). We thus studied the dependence be-
tween various factors and the appearance of spiritual religions, not the
existence of such religions.All of the models are stochastic models (Poisson processes) whereby, in
each region and at each time step, spiritual religions have a certain proba-
bility of appearing based on some emergence rate. The form of that emer-
gence rate depends on the model.
(1) In the null model (or homogeneous Poisson model), the rate is
constant over time (i.e., the appearance of spiritual religions does
not rely on any factor): lðtiÞ=a. This model is used as a control
model.
(2) In single-factor models, the rate depends upon one factor, e.g., en-
ergy capture. The dependence is taken to be of the general form
lðtiÞ=axbi , where xi is the value of the factor at the corresponding
time and a and b are some unknown parameters to be estimated.
Growth parameters can take negative values that are inconsistent
with the rate formula above, so for those parameters, we used
instead lðtiÞ=aðxi2 xminÞb.
(3) In two-factor models, the rate depends upon two factors, e.g., en-
ergy capture and state population. The general form now writes as
lðtiÞ=axbi ygi , where xi and yi are the two factors and a, b, and g are
the unknown parameters.
Maximum-likelihood parameters in each type of model can be estimated
using gradient descent on the log likelihood (LLH) of data. They can also be
determined analytically by searching for sets of parameters where the LLH
gradient vanishes, yielding the following:
(1) For the null model, a^=ntrans=
P
idti, where ntrans is the number of tran-
sitions in the data set and dti is the duration of time step I (in other
words, the estimated rate is simply equal to the number of observed
transitions divided by the overall durations of observations com-
bined with the overall regions of observations).
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Models were compared using the corrected AIC (AICc, which corrects the
maximum a posteriori LLH (LLHmax) for the number of estimated
parameters:




where k is the number of parameters in the model (from 0 to 2) and N is the
number of data points. The model with the lowest AICc is the most likely (a
model can be said to capture data significantly better than another one if its
AICc score is at least 3–4 bits lower than the other). Here, we used differen-
tial AIC, i.e., the difference between AICc for the null model and AICc for the
model under consideration. A higher-differential AIC thus means a more-
likely model.
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